

COST E19 - Working Group 2
June 28th ; Sopron/Hungary

Effects of Multi-Level Co-ordination on NFP Processes

Karl Hogl, Vienna

Content


- the problem
- the topic within the conception of COST E19
- defining ML-co-ordination / governance
- the approach
- modes of ML-co-ordination
- effects on elements of NFP processes
 - Participation
 - Inter-sectoral co-ordination
 - Decentralisation
 - (I terative, adaptive approaches)

→ propositions

The Problem

The Risk of Deadlock and inappropriate policy outputs

- The NFP concept calls for co-ordination among different levels of government.
- Policy-making striving to co-ordinate increasing numbers of levels and arenas runs the risk to end up in deadlock (“joint-decision trap”).
- Separated but interdependent arenas are likely to produce inappropriate outputs without being able to change the responsible institutional conditions.
- The challenge is even aggravated by the claim to implement inter-sectoral co-ordination and participatory approaches.



The Topic

regarding process
 regarding output
 regarding outcome

evaluation of the significance of NFPs in comparison to other policy means ...

Definition

No elaborated “MLG-theory”; approaches refer to the dispersion of authority away from central governments: upwards to the supranational level, downwards to sub-national levels and sideways to public/private networks.

Rational

Governance must operate on multiple scales in order to capture variations in the territorial reach of policies and of externalities.

+ prevalent arguments for decentralisation: better reflect local preferences and conditions, facilitate commitment, competition and policy innovation, e.g.

Approach

- discussing theoretical concepts of ML-coordination; approaches suggest to refer to e.g.
 - international relations theory, and
 - to narrower concepts of interaction and co-ordination. (e.g. 'Joint-Decisions Trap Theorem' - F.W. Scharpf; 'Logic of Two-Level Games' – R. Putnam)
- search for failure and success-stories in other policy domains (e.g. employment, regional & rural development policies)

Basic Modes of ML-Co-ordination in NFP Processes

- Mutual Adjustment: systems competition; need to show up with national reports puts some pressure on national policy making.
- Intergovernmental Agreement: limited to results which are preferable to the status quo for each party.
- Joint Decisions: needs some centralisation of governing functions (e.g. EU)
- (Hierarchical Direction)

New approach of ML-co-ordination form EU policy-making

- Procedures of open co-ordination

Effects on NFP elements

Abbreviations.: **IS** ... affecting inter-sectoral coordination; **P** ... participation,
D ... decentralisation, **AD** .. adaptive, iterative approaches)

- Policy-making striving to co-ordinate increasing numbers of levels and arenas runs the risk of getting caught in pitfalls. (**IS**, **P**, **D**, "joint-decision trap theorem", F.W. Scharpf)
- The likelihood of deadlock can be reduced by allowing actors who are not purely oriented on interest and party politics to participate and act as policy brokers / policy entrepreneurs (**P**, "joint-decision trap theorem", F.W. Scharpf).
- One pattern of linking levels which may prevent deadlock is "hierarchical-sequential ordering" of negotiation processes, either following a top-down approach (-> centralisation) or a bottom-up approach (decentralisation).
(**D**, **P**, **IS**, "joint-decision trap theorem", EU policy-making, F.W. Scharpf; Benz et al).

Effects on NFP elements

- “Sequential ordering” assumes that the overall task can be broken down into sub-tasks, apply a separation decision-making powers distinguishing different stages or aspects of decision-making (about principles, institutional design, budgeting, programming, implementation, e.g.), distributive from factual aspect or regional entities e.g. (IS, D, P, “joint-decision trap theorem”, EU policy-making, F.W. Scharpf; Benz et al).
- Another pattern promising to evade deadlock is to co-ordinate simultaneously operation arenas by the exchange of information and persuasion (“loose coupling” by “policy brokers”) instead of hierarchical direction.
(D, P, IS EU regional policy-making, Benz et al).

Effects on NFP elements

- The “procedures of open co-ordination” establish a recursive process of inter-level co-ordination, comprising joint problem analysis, goal setting and benchmarking as well as monitoring and evaluation. (AD, IS, from EU policy making, F.W. Scharpf)
- These procedures can also provide a strategy to prevent deadlock and negative effects of “systems competition”. (AD, IS, see above)
- The possibility of making “package deals” may very much extend the common win-set. Thus, the probability of agreements on substantive results also depends on the levels of governance and the sectors involved in the processes. (IS, D, “logic of ...”, R. Putnam).

Effects on NFP elements

- Embedding NFPs in the ML-rural development context may require to implement the “partnership principle” with its devolutionary implications, i.e. the formal involvement of sub-national actors and social partners in decision-making. (D, P, EC 1257/1999, EC 1260/1999), Benz and Eberlein)
- More general, Reg. 1257/1999 stipulates goals, elements and procedures which closely correspond to our current understanding of the NFP concept, i.e. the modern concept of SFM, inter-sectoral and ml-co-ordination, participation of private and sub-national actors, a medium range planning horizon, and recurring monitoring and evaluation. (IS, D, P, AD, EC 1257/1999 and, EC 1260/1999)

Effects on NFP elements

- To take full advantage of cross-border policy learning, not only the international liaison officials but the actors in charge of national forest policy formulation and implementation should be actively involved in international co-ordination and exchange. (P)
- Strong vertical sectoral linkages and professional fraternities provide channels for successful ml-co-ordination but may entail the dominance of one leading sector at the expense of inter-sectoral co-ordination.
(IS, EU regional policy-making, Benz et al).
- Politicisation of an issue may activate actors who are less worried about the consequences of non-agreement, entailing a reduced overall win-set (P, IS, "logic of two-level games", R. Putnam).

Effects on NFP elements

- ML-systems provide new points of access to actors who could not participate in or influence national policy processes.
(P, IS, EU policy making)
- The willingness to co-operate at decentralised levels often strongly depends on the “stimulating” effect of funding from the central levels. (D, P, EU regional policy-making, Benz et al).
- The readiness for inter-sectoral co-ordination is often higher at the lower levels of government, where worries about the effects on the clients come to the fore. The political dimensions are especially significant at the higher levels in the course of agenda setting and policy formation.
(D, IS, Peters 1998).

Effects on NFP elements

- ML-co-ordination processes comprising supranational and sub-national levels requires actors able to act. The task of participating in decision-making on multiple levels favours those actors with the resources to finance such participation (P, D, from EU policy making).
- In connection to the problems of participation, ml-governance arrangements often face serious problems with regard to
 - representation (the more distant the level of decision-making is from those who are affected) (P, D)
 - transparency (actors at one level blame those from others for policy failure; difficulties to follow processes and to hold decision-makers accountable, e.g.) (P, D)

Final Remark

All the procedural NFP elements have one common programmatic core: to involve more policy actors, more levels of governance, more people in the whole policy cycle

→ its all about problems of “co-ordination”

Thank you !